In the unnamed number of decades I have been paying attention to politics I have, more or less, come to regard public administration as the art of observing, understanding and designing policies that take best advantage of economic, human and natural resources within a local dynamic that enables government to function and function well. A well functioning county government must be able to meet its state mandated functions which includes maintaining adequate staffing, be able to pay its payroll and pension obligations and repay any debt or bonds. Failure to meet any one of these responsibilities may force the dissolution of the county government and a state takeover of all assets.

The structure advisory committee nine page document barely qualifies as a report in its draft form but it does make three observations I can agree with with.

1) “The emphasis from the governing body has been almost exclusively directed to cutting costs but with insufficient regard to the resulting, downside risks.” Obviously, one of the many downside risks is that inadequate staffing results in significantly reduced services threatening the county’s viability to govern itself.

2) Department heads are given insufficient authority to properly administer their responsibilities. The commissioners have relegated themselves to micromanaging departments even removing spending authority within approved operating budgets. Effectively, being a department head is little more than figure head who ultimately takes the blame for countywide dysfunction beyond their control.

3) The county’s problems stem from inadequate revenue. The report doesn’t address bringing in additional revenue but the county does not have a viable recovery plan.

There is no indication of when this report was drafted, where it has been released since it didn’t happen within public view, (I received my copy from someone not on the committee), why the interview results are not available online nor is it clear why the local paper chose to write about it now considering the reporter has not attended the committee meetings. The advisory committee has severely limited its effectiveness and opportunities for finding successful solutions to the county’s economic ills by focusing a worm’s eye view on costs. “This committee was formed with a clear bias toward organizational streamlining and cost reduction.”

Coos County Commission was warned in 2009 by the Governor’s Task Force on Federal Forest Payments and County Services in harsh and clearly understandable terms that the county needed to raise revenues.

In 24 of Oregon’s 36 counties, revenue losses will exceed those suffered by the state during the recession of 2001-03, averaging 28 percent of their discretionary general funds and 46 percent of their road funds, once SRS payments cease These 24 counties are largely rural and less populated, but they include the state’s fourth and sixth most populous counties, Lane and Jackson. The effects of revenue losses of this magnitude will compromise public health and safety, undermine funding for county roads and exacerbate job losses in almost every region of Oregon.

Further, all school districts in Oregon will share in these revenue losses…

Unless other solutions are found, the crisis confronting the hard hit counties and the erosion of funding for schools will trigger new demands for shared resources from state government and state taxpayers. Competition for shares of the state budget will intensify. State lawmakers will have to choose among schools, health care and highways at the state level and public health, safety and roads at the local level. No matter how these competing demands are resolved, Oregon overall will have fewer resources available for public services and public investment.

Instead of bringing any of the many options for raising revenue before the public Commissioners Main, Parry and Messerle have focused on airy concepts like carbon and water credits and a different form of federal taxpayer bail out in the form of tribal management of the CBWR. The likelihood of any of these schemes even coming to fruition much less making up for budget shortfalls are almost non-existent and the consequences of this poor planning is also laid out in the Task Force report and calls for state intervention and the possible dissolution of or forced merger with another county.

A. Stage One: Monitoring and Technical Assistance

During Stage One, counties would report yearly financials and budgets to the Secretary of State, Treasurer’s Office and Department of Revenue (DOR). One of these agencies would evaluate county budgets, which would be required to be submitted by all counties in the form described at ORS 294.361 et seq. At this
stage, the reviewing agency would provide technical assistance to counties.

B. Stage Two: Financial Control Board Crafts Recovery Plan
At Stage Two, the State would establish a Financial Control Board (FCB). The FCB would consist of financial, legal and accounting experts who are appointed by the Governor and legislative leadership. A separate FCB would be assigned for each county. The FCB would review county financial reports and budgets to
obtain a full understanding of the county’s financial position.
Once fully apprised of the county’s financial situation, the FCB would aid elected officials in developing and adhering to a Recovery Plan. The FCB would recommend targeted cuts to county services to reduce expenditures and/or asset sales, fee increases or other measures to raise revenues. The FCB may also
recommend approaches to better manage debt and reestablish the creditworthiness of the county.
Once the FCB completes its Recovery Plan the FCB will monitor the county for compliance. If the FCB finds that the county has failed to adopt and adhere to the plan in a timely manner, the State may cut off State funding to the county.

C. Stage Three: State Takeover

If the FCB’s intervention fails to resuscitate the county, the FCB may recommend that the State initiate Stage Three intervention. At Stage Three, the FCB assumes all powers of the county’s governing body (as defined by statute or Charter), including:
i. Power to allow State to take over services;
ii. Power to cut services, lay off employees and otherwise reduce expenditures;
iii. Power to sell county property to increase county funds;
iv. Power to access local funds and direct payment for services with those funds;
v. Power to issue debt obligations (note Constitutional limits on debt issuance) on behalf of local government;
vi. Power to make decisions regarding servicing municipal debt;
and
vii. Power to refer ballot measurers to voters.

The FCB’s intervention and monitoring will continue until the county’s finances are stable and the county is able to provide mandated services, including public health and safety services. After the FCB determines that the county is stable, it would return powers to the county’s governing body.

D. Stage Four: County Dissolution

If the FCB is unable to stabilize the county and determines that the county’s continued existence is not viable, it would recommend that the State initiate Stage Four intervention. At Stage Four, the FCB will assist local elected officials in dissolving the county or merging with an existing county.

On November 2, I asked the commissioners if they would hold hearings to discuss some of the options suggested by the Task Force and not unsurprisingly they have each ignored me. If the people don’t demand some public hearings to discuss VIABLE options now, this commission may well go down as the three who drove the last nails into the coffin that was once Coos County.