This story was co-published with Foreign Policy.
Accra is a city of choking red dust where almost
no rain falls for three months at a time and clothes hung out on a line dry in
15 minutes. So the new five-star Mövenpick hotel affords a haven of sorts
in Ghana’s crowded capital, with manicured lawns, amply watered vegetation, and
uniformed waiters gliding poolside on roller skates to offer icy drinks to
guests. A high concrete wall rings the grounds, keeping out the city’s
overflowing poor who hawk goods in the street by day and the homeless who lie
on the sidewalks by night.
The Mövenpick, which opened in 2011, fits
the model of a modern international luxury hotel, with 260 rooms, seven floors,
and 13,500 square feet of retail space displaying $2,000 Italian handbags and
other wares. But it is exceptional in at least one respect: It was financed by
a combination of two very different entities: a multibillion-dollar investment
company largely controlled by a Saudi prince, and the poverty-fighting World
The investment company, Kingdom Holding
Company, has a market value of $12 billion, and Forbes ranks its principal owner, Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, as the
world’s 29th-richest person, estimating his net
worth at $18 billion. The World Bank, meanwhile, contributed its part through
its International Finance Corporation (IFC),
set up back in 1956to muster cheap
loans and other financial support for private businesses that contribute to its
planet-improving mandate. “At the World Bank, we have made the world’s most
pressing development issue—to reduce global poverty—our mission,”
the bank proclaims.
Why, then, did the IFC give a Saudi
prince’s company an attractively priced $26 million loan to help build the
Mövenpick, a hotel the prince was fully capable of financing himself? The
answer is that the IFC’s portfolio of billions of dollars in loans and
investments is not in fact primarily targeted at helping the impoverished. At
least as important is the goal of making a profit for the World Bank.
I reached this conclusion after traveling
to Ghana—in many ways typical of the more than 100 countries where the
IFC works—to see firsthand the kinds of problems the World Bank’s lenders
are supposed to tackle and whether their efforts are really working on the
ground. I pored through thousands of pages of the bank’s publicly available
reports and financial statements and talked to dozens of experts familiar with
its performance in Ghana and many other countries.
In case after case, the verdict was the
same: The IFC likes to work with huge corporations, funding projects these
companies could finance themselves. Its partners are billionaires and massive
multinationals, from oil giants like ExxonMobil to Grupo Arcor, the huge
Argentine candy-maker. Its projects include not only glitzy hotels and high-end
shopping malls, but also gritty gold and copper mines and oil pipelines, some
of which end up benefiting the very corrupt, authoritarian regimes that the
rest of the World Bank is urging to change. Nearly a quarter of the IFC’s
paid-in capital from member governments—now standing at $2.4
billion—came from U.S. taxpayers, and every president in the World Bank’s
69-year history has been an American. But the United States has had little
complaint with these practices, even when they have become a subject of public
Not long ago, the World Bank’s internal
watchdog sharply criticized the IFC’s approach, saying it gives little more
than lip service to the bank’s poverty-fighting mission. The report, a major 2011 review by the
bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, found that fewer than half the IFC investments
it studied involved fighting poverty. “[M]ost IFC investment projects generate
satisfactory returns but do not provide evidence of identifiable opportunities
for the poor to participate in, contribute to, or benefit from the economic
activities that the project supports,” the report concluded. In fact, it said,
only 13 percent of 500 projects studied “had objectives with an explicit focus
on poor people,” and even those that did, the report found, had a “limited”
impact. The IFC did not dispute the conclusions.
There is certainly need in countries like
Ghana, whose per capita GDP ranks in the bottom third of the world, with life
expectancy in the bottom 15 percent and infant mortality in the bottom fourth.
The IFC committed about $145 million in loans and equity in Ghana just in
fiscal year 2012. Yet Takyiwaa Manuh, who advises the Ghanaian government on economic development as a member
of the National Development Planning Commission, told me she doesn’t think of
the IFC’s investments “as fighting poverty. Just because some people are
employed, it is hard to say that is poverty reduction.”
But the policies continue. Why? Tycoons
and megacompanies offer relatively low risk and generally assured returns for
the IFC, allowing it to reinvest the earnings in more such projects. Only a
portion of this money ends up benefiting local workers, and critics contend
that the IFC’s investments often work against local development needs.“The IFC’s model itself is a problem,”
says Jesse Griffiths, director of the European Network on Debt and Development
(Eurodad), a Belgian-based nonprofit. “The IFC undermines democracy with its
piecemeal, top-down approach to development that follows the priorities of
“We’re not saying we’re perfect,” Rashad
Kaldany told me. He is a veteran IFC executive and currently its vice president
for global industries. The IFC operates “at the frontier,” he said. “We know
that not every project will work. It’s about trying to make a difference to the
poor and about achieving financial sustainability”—twin goals that are
challenging in combination.
When it comes to luxury hotels like the
Mövenpick in downtown Accra, however, the IFC offers no apology for its
investments, even making the case for them as an economic boon for poor
countries. A January 2012 report from the World Bank
says hotels “play a critical role in development as they catalyze tourism and
business infrastructure,” noting its partners include such “leading” firms as
luxury chains Shangri-La, Hilton, Marriott, InterContinental—and, of
In Accra, Mary-Jean Moyo, the IFC’s
in-country manager for Ghana, told me the new hotel fights poverty by creating
jobs. To illustrate, she recalled how the Mövenpick’s manager “noticed that a
few boys roller-skate on Sundays outside the hotel. The manager decided to hire
them to work at the pool. That is development and helping local people.” How
many were hired, I asked. Six, Moyo responded.
When I spoke with Stuart Chase, the
Mövenpick’s manager, he told me that other kinds of investments besides the new
hotel he was clearly proud of would do far more to stimulate Ghana’s economy
and reduce poverty. Chase, who has lived and worked in Ghana for years,mentioned the country’s congested and
potholed roads, poor electricity system, limited food supplies, and lack of
trade schools. “There is no hotel school and no vocational training in the
country,” he complained. As a result, all the top staff members among his 300
employees are foreign.
Besides, Accra already has close to a
dozen luxury hotels. Before taking over the Mövenpick, Chase managed another
nearby five-star hotel owned by Ghana’s Social Security and National Insurance
Trust, the country’s pension system. So when the IFC decided to finance Prince
Alwaleed’s hotel, it was entering into direct competition with the people it
claims it wants to lift out of poverty. Moyo acknowledged to me that the IFC
didn’t study the local hotel scene before making this investment, unlike its
standard practice. “We knew the company and had another successful investment
in Kingdom that made the Ghana deal attractive to us,” she said. The other
investment? A $20 million deal in 2010 to help develop five luxury venues in
Kenya, complete with heated swimming pools, golf courses, and organized
U.S. Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Vermont
Democrat who sits on the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that has
jurisdiction over U.S. participation in the World Bank, called the Ghana loan “not an appropriate
use of public funds” when alerted to it by a 2011 Washington Times article. The U.S.
Treasury Department, which administers American participation in the World
Bank, defended the loan, telling the newspaper that the IFC package replaced
funding expected from private banks that pulled out when market conditions
soured, putting the entire $103 million project at risk. When I was in Accra in
July, however, at least two other major hotel projects were under construction
with private financing obtained in the same period. The prince’s
representatives didn’t respond to requests for comment.
* * *
are hardly the only IFC investments that offer at best limited prospects for
serving its poverty-fighting mandate. Founded just a dozen years after the
World Bank itself, the IFC has in recent years become its fastest-growing unit.
It now has a staff of some 3,400 people in 103 countries and made $15 billion
in loan commitments in 2012 across about 580 projects—more than double
its 2006 total and a figure that’s projected to grow to about $20 billion in
the next few years.
The original notion was that while the
World Bank was lending directly to poor countries, the IFC would stimulate the
growth of private business, entrepreneurship, and financial markets in some of
those same countries by lending to and investing in for-profit corporations.
The founders, notably including a General Foods executive named Robert Garner, emphasized that the IFC would participate
only in projects for which “sufficient private capital is not available on
That concept has become muddied over the
years, as well-heeled borrowers with excellent credit have sought to take
advantage of the IFC’s relatively attractive loan terms and other investment
vehicles, plus, in some cases, the cachet associated with World Bank support.
The IFC’s growth got a boost in the early 1980s when it was permitted for the
first time to raise money from the global capital markets by issuing bonds.
More recently, its growth has accelerated as it has entered new businesses,
including trade finance, derivatives, and private equity, sometimes to the
annoyance of private banks with which it competes.
Today, the IFC’s booming list of business
partners reads like a who’s who of giant multinational corporations: Dow
Chemical, DuPont, Mitsubishi, Vodafone, and many more. It has funded fast-food
chains like Domino’s Pizza in South Africa and Kentucky Fried Chicken in
Jamaica. It invests in upscale shopping malls in Egypt, Ghana, the former
Soviet republics, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. It backs candy-shop chains
in Argentina and Bangladesh; breweries with global beer behemoths like
SABMiller and with other breweries in the Czech Republic, Laos, Romania,
Russia, and Tanzania; and soft-drink distribution for the likes of Coca-Cola,
PepsiCo, and their competitors in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mali, Russia, South
Sudan, Uzbekistan, and more.
The criticism of most such
investments—from a broad array of academics and watchdog groups as well
as local organizations in the poor countries themselves—is that they make
little impact on poverty and could just as easily be undertaken without IFC
subsidies. In some cases, critics contend, the projects hold back development
and exacerbate poverty, not to mention subjecting affected countries to
pollution and other ills.
The debate is swirling as the World Bank
has a new leader, installed in July: Jim Yong Kim, an American physician who
recently stepped down as president of Dartmouth College. The bank declined to
make him available to comment for this article, and in his brief tenure so far,
he has given little hint of his view of the IFC. In both his statement when he took office in July and
on his first overseas visit, to Ghana’s neighbor to the west, Ivory Coast, he
did note briefly the importance of the IFC within the World Bank Group and of
the private sector to global job creation.
The IFC is also in the middle of a change
in leadership. Its former head, Lars Thunell, recently completed his term, and
Chinese national Jin-Yong Cai, a Goldman Sachs partner who was in charge of the
firm’s Chinese banking operations, succeeded him in October. At that time,
Kaldany, who had been serving as the IFC’s acting CEO, stepped back to the post
of vice president for global industries.
The IFC’s operations have been the
subject not only of outside criticism but of significant parts of 2011’s
stinging internal report and other critiques from within the World Bank. The 2011 document, in which the bank’s
Independent Evaluation Group examined the IFC’s activities over the previous
decade, portrayed a profit-oriented, deal-driven organization that often fails
to reach the poor, and at times may even sacrifice the poor, in a drive to earn
a healthy return on its investments: “Greater effort is needed in translating
the strategic intentions into actions in investment operations and advisory
services to enhance IFC’s poverty focus.”
But the IFC’s money-generating strategy
has at least one benefit: It sustains the jobs of the people who work for it.
The “more money the IFC makes, the more the bank has [available] to invest,”
says Griffiths, the director of Eurodad. “Staff is incentivized to make money.”
Francis Kalitsi, a former IFC employee
who is now a managing partner at private-equity firm Serengeti Capital in
Accra, has a similar view. “To get ahead, you had to book big transactions,” he
recalls of his time at the IFC. “The IFC is very profit-focused. The IFC does
not address poverty, and its investments rarely touch the poor.”
The IFC sets annual targets for the
number, size, and types of deals employees should complete, and it awards
performance bonuses for reaching these targets, according to several current
and former IFC staffers. “If you don’t reach the target, you don’t get a
bonus,” says Alan Moody, a former IFC manager who now works elsewhere at the
World Bank. Deals often come to the IFC from private companies, not the other
way around. “We choose our projects by identifying key clients and asking them
what their needs are,” says the IFC’s Moyo. That means, though, that by
following private companies’ priorities, the IFC makes investments that are not
necessarily aligned with countries’ own development strategies.
Even if the IFC focused more of its
resources on poverty, it doesn’t have a good way to track whether its work has
any impact. The 2011 report—which advises that the IFC “needs to think
carefully about questions such as who the poor are, where they are located, and
how they can be reached”—criticizes theIFCfor lacking metrics
for its investments, saying it fails to “[d]efine, monitor, and report poverty
outcomes for projects.”
The IFC does not contest these
criticisms. Its management responded to the evaluation group’s report by stating, “We broadly agree with [the]
report’s lessons and recommendations” and conceded that the “IFC has not been
consistent in stating … the anticipated poverty reduction effects of a
project.” The IFC notes that it several years ago began using a Development
Outcome Tracking System (DOTS) to measure the effectiveness of its projects at
spurring economic development and alleviating poverty. This system, however,
has drawn snickers from a number of IFC clients. They note that the DOTS
ratings rely heavily on self-reporting by the recipient companies and depend to
some extent on financial data for the entire firm, often with multiple
divisions around the world, rather than focusing on the specific area of the
IFC-funded project. Still, Kaldany expresses enthusiasm for the effort, saying
it is pathbreaking and getting better.
Meanwhile, there has been little evidence
of change on the ground. Everywhere I looked—in Ghana, in nearby West
Africa, and globally—the IFC still seems to be giving its mandate to
fight poverty short shrift.
In finance, for example, R. Yofi Grant,
executive director of Databank, one of Ghana’s largest banks, told me that the
IFC’s practice of providing loans at attractive terms to multinational
companies “crowds out local banks and private-equity firms by taking the
juiciest investments and walking away with a healthy return.”
Grant says that the IFC recently
organized a $115 million financing package for global telecom giantVodafone to expand its operations in
Ghana, even though six telecom companies already operate in the country.
Despite such robust private investment, the IFC’s loan package for Vodafone was
its second in two years. “That is not poverty reduction, and these are not
frontier investments,” Grant says, referring to the IFC’s refrain that it
invests where other financiers might not. “The IFC says all the right things
and does all the wrong things.”
* * *
A thousand miles east of Ghana are Cameroon and Chad, which exemplify a major and highly
controversial domain of IFC investment, one where the stakes are often higher
than with hotels and shopping malls. That domain is energy.
As of the end of 2011, the IFC reported a
$2 billion oil-and-gas portfolio, investing with 30 companies in 23 countries
and, the IFC boasted, achieving “Award Winning Recognition from
the Market.” But critics, including environmentalists and nonprofit groups such
as the Bretton Woods Project and Christian Aid, contend that the projects often
exacerbate the poverty they are supposed to alleviate. The projects, they say,
frequently escalate local conflict and corruption, displace communities,
disrupt livelihoods, and contribute to the emission of greenhouse gases and
In 2003, an independent review panel
within the World Bank even recommended that the bank, including the IFC, pull
out of all oil, natural gas, and coal-mining projects by 2008, saying such
loans do not benefit the poor who live where the natural resources are found.
But the World Bank’s board overruled these recommendations. The bank ultimately
agreed to an approach that is “business as usual with marginal changes,” Emil
Salim, the Indonesian officialwho
led the bank’s review, told Bloomberg News in 2004. In a
conference call with reporters at the time, IFC executive Kaldany said, “There was very broad
consensus that we should remain engaged; we do add value.”
The example of Chad and Cameroon,
however, offers a more complicated picture. In 2000, the IFC invested roughly
$200 million with ExxonMobil, Chevron, and others, along with the governments
of Chad and Cameroon, to support the construction of a nearly $4 billion
oil-pipeline project that experts estimate will generate more than $5 billion
in revenue over the 25-year life of the project from wells mainly in landlocked
Chad to a port in Cameroon.
The World Bank and its unit that makes loans to private businesses, the International Finance Corporation, have raised questions about ProPublica’s ethics in the reporting of this story. Specifically, they have questioned whether the reporter, freelancer Cheryl Strauss Einhorn, properly identified herself as working for ProPublica as she interviewed present or former World Bank staffers in Ghana, where much of the reporting for the article was done. We take such issues very seriously and have looked closely into the Bank’s concerns.
The matter would seem simple. ProPublica’s ethics guidelines state clearly that “we don’t misidentify or misrepresent ourselves to get a story. When we seek an interview, we identify ourselves as ProPublica journalists.” The complication in this case is that Einhorn, an experienced financial journalist who has worked for such outlets as Barron’s magazine and CNBC, is now both a freelance writer and an adjunct professor at the Columbia Business School in New York City. In reporting the story as a freelance for ProPublica, she was also gathering material that could be used in teaching her classes or in academic publishing.
Einhorn’s contacts with World Bank staff at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., seem uncontroversial. Last July 27, she emailed David Theis, a bank communications official: “I am working on a project for Pro Publica about emerging market development and the World Bank, focusing on the private sector model at the International Finance Corporation.” He guided her to other bank staffers.
The World Bank and the IFC have centered their complaints earlier in July, when Einhorn set up interviews in Ghana and then traveled there. In several instances, her emails make no reference to ProPublica, but rather focus entirely on her role at Columbia. “I teach at the Columbia Business School and am planning to travel to Accra on July 18 as part of my research on economic development issues and projects,” she wrote in one typical email.
Einhorn says that when she actually held the interviews, she orally made clear, as our policy requires, that ProPublica was involved and that she hoped to publish her work. At least some of the interviewees say that they did not hear any mention of ProPublica. We can find no written or recorded evidence to show whose memories are correct.
However, three things are clear:
Einhorn was hardly trying to keep her ProPublica connection a secret in Ghana. Emails successfully seeking interviews with top in-country officials of Coca Cola and Newmont Mining, both significant IFC clients, made clear reference to ProPublica.
Einhorn was not misrepresenting or misidentifying herself when she invoked her Columbia connection. She expects her research in Ghana to be useful in her academic role. The worst she can be accused of is having been incomplete in identifying herself – and even then, if her memory is correct, she made the ProPublica connection orally.
In any case, the interviewees didn’t ask or get agreement to make their comments not for quotation. In an era of publish or perish in academe and instant Tweeting from classrooms, it’s hard to imagine that remarks to a professor would be substantially less public than those to a reporter.
-Paul E. Steiger
The two countries are even poorer than
Ghana to the west. Per capita income in Chad ranks 193rd in the world, compared with
185th place for Cameroon and 172nd for Ghana. Life expectancy at birth in Chad,
at 48.7 years, is the world’s absolute worst,
and the country has been ruled for the last two decades by heavy-handed
dictator Idriss Déby.
“Conditions were and are a hardship and
horrible,” says Peter Rosenblum, co-director of the Human Rights Institute at
Columbia University, who argued that the pipeline project should demand
protections for the civilian population. The bulk of the oil revenue was
supposed to be set aside for food, education, health care, and infrastructure.
But in the face of attacks from rebel groups supported by neighboring Sudan,
and asserting a need to defend the pipeline, Déby instead channeled substantial
chunks into arms purchases, bringing criticism not only from human rights
groups but from the World Bank. As critics of the project had warned, the oil
bonanza increased the stakes for control of the country and added to the civil
What happened with Chad is not an
isolated incident. Despite perennial controversies over energy and mining
projects, often the subject of fierce disputes related to everything from their
environmental impacts to the extent they boost authoritarian regimes, the IFC
continues to invest in them extensively. Just in 2012, the IFC announced
investments in mining projects for gold, copper, and diamonds in places like
Mongolia, Liberia, and South Africa, as well as investments in oil and gas
projects in Colombia, Ivory Coast, the Middle East, and North Africa.
Moreover, as with Chad’s Déby, the IFC
continues to lend and invest in countries with heavy-handed rulers such as
Syria (Bashar al-Assad) and Venezuela (Hugo Chávez). Kaldany told me there were
about a dozen dictatorships, which he wouldn’t name, where the IFC would simply
not do business. But then there is a second tier, where he is inclined to work.
“It is a tradeoff. We can have a positive influence,” he said, referring to a
recent IFC deal in now civil war-torn Syria to fund microfinance. He said the
IFC is insisting on increasingly tight financial controls in such countries to
ensure that the proceeds from the projects are targeted directly to the poor
rather than to sustaining the dictators’ hold on power. He acknowledged that
the controls in the Chad case were not nearly tight enough and that the IFC
ultimately had to pull out.
The IFC’s critics see two obvious ways to
fix it: dramatically overhaul its priorities or sharply reduce its funding and
channel those resources toward the type of World Bank projects that more
closely align with its anti-poverty mission.
Kaldany said that the IFC is seeking to
increase its number of small projects, of under $5 million and tightly targeted
on the poor, and to devote more attention to the poorest of the poor countries.
In the most recent fiscal year, it generated 105 of the smaller projects, 20
percent of its total deals, although a much smaller percentage of its total
dollar outlays. (IFC officials couldn’t immediately provide that number.)
But don’t count on a new direction.
Although its new leadership has remained publicly mum, the IFC’s new chief,
Cai, has told people he strongly supports its current strategy.
* * *
In Accra, not far from the new Mövenpick, the IFC’s posh offices—sporting a lawn, flowers, and
private parking—sit amid a slum, surrounded by an imposing concrete wall
topped by coils of barbed wire. The only paved part of the road to the IFC is
directly in front of the guarded complex, which has no sign announcing its
identity. The rest of the road is a winding, dusty dirt path filled with
potholes and surrounded by hovels erected out of battered metal or wood.
Barefoot children sit amid goats and
roving chickens, on ground dotted by garbage and litter. Women cook tiny fish
strung onto sticks over an open fire, ignoring the near-100-degree
temperatures. I approached them one day in July, and some of them said they had
lived there for 15 years. When asked whether they knew what the World Bank is,
they said no. When told that it fights poverty, many of them laughed.
“We need help, and we know there are
places that help,” said one woman who was cooking as two young boys clung to her
legs. “But we have never heard of them.”
Cheryl Strauss Einhorn is a financial
journalist and adjunct professor at Columbia Business School.