According to one of the US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, US taxpayer money is being used to support child prostitution in Afghanistan. DynCorp, another one of those private security companies the government uses to expatriate money from the US treasury, supplied drugs and cash to pimps to supply young boys to entice recruits for the Afghani police.

DynCorp, like Xe (formerly Blackwater), is composed of ex special forces and was contracted to train the Afghanis. The company earns approximately $2B annually, most of it from US taxpayers, .
The cable is dated June, 2009, but the bacha bazi (“boy-play”) party was held earlier.

Another item revealed in the cable is that DynCorp’s contract prohibits the US from policing the company’s actions with US military oversight.

US Assistant Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli and Afghan Interior Minister Hanif Atmar appear to be bracing for an imminent release of the scandal in the media and fear “… blown out of proportion, an outcome which would not be good for either the U.S. or Afghanistan”.

The practice of bacha bazi violates Sharia Law and Afghan civil law and was banned under the Taliban.

KUNDUZ RTC DYNCORP UPDATE

4. (C) On June 23, Assistant Ambassador Mussomeli met with MOI Minister Hanif Atmar on a number of issues, beginning with the April 11 Kunduz RTC DynCorp investigation. Amb Mussomeli opened that the incident deeply upset us and we took strong steps in response. An investigation is on-going, disciplinary actions were taken against DynCorp leaders in Afghanistan, we are also aware of proposals for new procedures, such as stationing a military officer at RTCs, that have been introduced for consideration. (Note: Placing military officers to oversee contractor operations at RTCs is not legally possible under the currentDynCorp contract.) Beyond remedial actions taken, we still hope the matter will not be blown out of proportion, an outcome which would not be good for either the U.S. or Afghanistan. A widely-anticipated newspaper article on the Kunduz scandal has not appeared but, if there is too much noise that may prompt the journalist to publish.

5. (C) Atmar said he insisted the journalist be told that publication would endanger lives. His request was that the U.S. quash the article and release of the video. Amb Mussomeli responded that going to the journalist would give her the sense that there is a more terrible story to report. Atmar then disclosed the arrest of two Afghan National Police (ANP) and nine other Afghans (including RTC language assistants) as part of an MoI investigation into Afghan “facilitators” of the event. The crime he was pursuing was “purchasing a service from a child,” which in Afghanistan is illegal under both Sharia law and the civil code, and against the ANP Code of Conduct for police officers who might be involved. He said he would use the civil code and that, in this case, the institution of the ANP will be protected, but he worried about the image of foreign mentors. Atmar said that President Karzai had told him that his (Atmar’s) “prestige” was in play in management of the Kunduz DynCorp matter and another recent event in which Blackwater contractors mistakenly killed several Afghan citizens. The President had asked him “Where is the justice?”

6. (C) Atmar said there was a larger issue to consider. He

KABUL 00001651 002 OF 003

understood that within DynCorp there were many “wonderful” people working hard, and he was keen to see proper action taken to protect them; but, these contractor companies do not have many friends. He was aware that many questions about them go to SRAP Holbrooke and, in Afghanistan, there is increasing public skepticism about contractors. On the other hand, the conduct of the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is disciplined. Looking at these facts, he said, he wanted CSTC-A in charge. He wanted the ANP to become a model security institution just like the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Directorate for Security (NDS), and the contractors were not producing what was desired. He suggested that the U.S. establish and independent commission to review the mentor situation, an idea he said Ambassador Eikenberry had first raised. Atmar added that he also wanted tighter control over Afghan employees. He was convinced that the Kunduz incident, and other events where mentors had obtained drugs, could not have happened without Afghan participation.

Jeremy Scahill, author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army, testified before Congress about US covert, offensive actions in Pakistan, Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden and Yemen. Scahill doesn’t specifically testify to the use of private contractors but has written that Xe has been working in Pakistan.